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The Synthetic a priori Proposition
of Kant's Ethical Philosophy
Nelson Potter
I.
I will consider Kant's claim that the categorical imperative (CI) is a synthetic a
priori proposition. 1 We know from the first Critique that such propositions are
likely to be very important, but also difficult to justify. Kant says exactly the same
things about the CI in the Grundlegung: the CI is difficult to justify2, but if we do
not succeed in justifying it, morality may be a mere "phantom of the brain.',3
Though little has been written on this topic, a correct understanding of this claim is
important to understanding Kant's views.
Kant describes synthetic a priori propositions as ones that express a necessary
relationship between two distinct concepts. Many philosophers doubt that there
could be any such propositions, saying that if any propositions do express neces-
sary relationships, one of these concepts must contain the other (as in "All trian-
gles are plane figures"). Still, if we could come to know some such propositions,
the knowledge could be quite useful to us, in moral and practical philosophy,
among other areas. Ethical intuitionists or realists such as G. E. Moore, H. A. Pri-
chard, and W. D. Ross claim to have such knowledge, whether or not they use the
terminology of "synthetic a priori." Without such knowledge in ethics, we might
well fear falling into relativism, scepticism, or subjectivism.4
1 Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, IV, 420; cf. Critique of Practical Reason, V,
31. References to Kant's works are to the volume and page of the passages referred to in the
Prussian Academy edition of Kant's works (Kants gesammeIte Schriften, herausgegeben von
der Deutschen (formerly koniglichen Preussischen) Akademie der Wissenschaften, 29 vol-
umes, Berlin: WaIter de Gruyter (and predecessors), 1902). Most English translations of
works referred to include these page numbers marginally. However, Religion Within the Lim-
its of Reason Alone, translated by Theodore M. Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson, as revised by
John Silber (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1960) does not; references to this work will give
first the Akademie volume and page, followed by the page of the English translation. Quota-
tions from the Critique of Pure Reason will follow the usual practice of giving the first (A)
and second (B) edition paginations.
2 Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, IV, 420, 444 - 5.
3 Ibid., IV, 445.
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The main reason for doubting that we can know such propositions, is that find-
ing an adequate epistemological basis for them is hard. Do they come to us by a
direct rational intuition of essences? Which mental faculty equips us to gain such
knowledge?
An optimistic epistemic tradition, which goes back at least to Plato, claims that
we can have such insight. Plato claimed epistemic access to a realm of indepen-
dently existing abstract essences or Forms. Kant, as the creator of the terminology
of the synthetic a priori, and as chief defender of the claim that we have knowl-
edge of such propositions, might be thought to be a part of this epistemically opti-
mistic, rationalist tradition. Though he was notoriously critical of rationalist claims
in his first Critique, perhaps he relented when the topic changed to ethics.
Our main question, then, will be: What about the CI makes it a synthetic a priori
proposition? I will develop and consider two opposed answers to this question. The
first, which I will call the "rational intuitionist" interpretation5, says that Kant de-
scribes the categorical imperative as synthetic a priori because it expresses a direct
insight by our rational faculties into the truth of a substantive moral principle. This
interpretation places Kant within the Platonic rationalist tradition. In moral philoso-
phy more recent rational intuitionists include H. A. Prichard and W. D. Ross. No
interpreter has developed the rational intuitionist reading of Kant in detail, but H. J.
Paton, John Marshall, and Ross himself all come close. I'll concentrate on Ross.
The second answer, which I will call the "motivational" view, is a new interpre-
tation that I will state and defend. On this view the CI is synthetic a priori because
it entails that rational agents can act from purely moral motives, that is, it ex-
presses a causal, motivational principle of human action. It is a priori because the
motivation is noumenal rather than phenomenal, a power to act from purely moral
motives.6 If the CI had no hold on human motivation, it would have no application
to human beings. Kant is thus a motivational intemalist, i.e., someone who be-
lieves that obligation entails motivation?
4 My intention in saying this is to describe a common fear among theorists without endors-
ing it.
5 I use the description "rational intuitionist," sometimes shortened to "intuitionist," rather
than the overbroad "rationalist." It is hard to find a fully satisfactory term, especially since
"intuitionist" is a term that has some variety of different uses. I agree with Christine Kors-
gaard in "Skepticism about Practical Reason" (see fn. 62 below) when she calls Kant a ra-
tionalist (in a different sense), and I think the present paper supports her views. The "rational
intuitionist" claims that the human mind has the power to acquire the knowledge of platonic
style rational essences.
6 It is well known that Kant thought that we could have no knowledge of noumenal
causes. However, according to doctrine of the "fact of pure reason" in the Critique of Practi-
cal Reason, the phenomena of moral consciousness point toward the existence of a noumenal
moral motivation whose character these moral phenomena give us some partial, indirect
knowledge of. I discuss this aspect of Kantian doctrine further below.
7 Recent writers who develop such a view include: Stephen Darwall, Impartial Reason,
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983. lY.D. Falk, Ought, Reasons, and Morality, Ithaca:
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On the rational intuitionist view the CI is a basic, substantive moral proposition,
rather like a statement formulating one of W. D. Ross's prima facie duties, from
which particular moral obligations can, at least in the absence of conflicting prima
facie duties, be deduced. Such a moral principle is a priori because we know it in
an extra-empirical way, viz., by direct, rational insight. It is synthetic because it is
a substantive moral statement that, when combined with factual statements, en-
ables us to deduce the moral wrongness or requiredness of certain acts. However,
intuitionists like Ross often are extemalists who regard such principles as mere
precepts, that say nothing about our motivation to act in accord with them. Such a
principle may be true, and we may even know it to be true, without our having any
tendency to act as the principle says we should. Any complete moral theory must
tell a story about moral motivation. But on such extemalist views that story forms
a separate chapter, a chapter that mentions facts logically distinct from the moral
principle itself and what it entails.
According to the motivational interpretation, Kant distinguishes between "the
moral law," which is a mere extemalist precept, considered without reference to
any agent's motivation, and the "categorical imperative," which refers to the same
moral demand as commanding a reluctant human will, one which might or might
not obey8. Kant regards the law as analytic, while the imperative is synthetic. In
Kant's view, given the nature of morality, only one principle of morality is possi-
ble and hence its formula can be discovered by conceptual analysis. Kant thinks he
can show that it must be a purely formal principle, and that only one formal moral
principle is possible.9 Further, Kant appears to think that a purely formal, and
hence analytic moral statement can have substantive moral implications, e.g.,
about the wrongness of making a lying promise. Kant writes lO, "A practical law
which I acknowledge as such must qualify for being universal law; this is an iden-
Cornell University Press, 1986. John Ladd. "The Desire to Do One's Duty for its Own Sake,"
in: Hector-Neri Castaneda / George Nakhnikian, eds: Morality and the Language of Conduct,
Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1963. Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism,
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970. Christine Korsgaard attributes such a view to
Kant, in Creating the Kingdom of Ends, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996; see
especially the essay entitled "Kant's analysis of obligation: the argument of Groundwork I:'
pp. 43 -76.
8 See Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, IV, 413.
9 See Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, IV, 420, for one of the several state-
ments by Kant of this point. The doctrine of the formality and deducibility of the basic princi-
ple of morality relates to what is usually called "the first formulation" of the CI, !he one t~at
mentions "universal law." Kant in the Groundwork also proposed two other major and dIS-
tinct formulations of the CI, the second being the formula of the end in itself, the third being
that of the kingdom of ends. Kant claims these other formulations are equivalent to the first.
There is considerable literature on this equivalence claim, beginning with the detailed discus-
sion by Paton in The Categorical Imperative, Hutchinson of Lo~do~, 1947. In this pap~r I
wi11limit discussion to the first formulation, the one that Kant claIms IS formal and dedUCIble
from the concept of morality.
10 At Critique of Practical Reason, V, 27.
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tical and therefore a self-evident proposition." Thus in Kant's view we don't need
a special rational (synthetic) insight into the moral essence of certain kinds of acts,
for the criterion of right and wrong can be discovered by mere philosophical analy-
sis, the results of which would be expressed by analytic propositions. In contrast,
the categorical imperative is synthetic because it adds to the moral law this motiva-
tional command directed at the human will. Both moral laws and moral impera-
tives may be described as principles.
Here we can note what might seem the peculiar character of Kant's arguments
against heteronomous moral principles. 11 They have sometimes seemed question-
begging because they merely show that the principles under discussion are heter-
onomous, and assume that the true principle of morality must be a principle of
autonomy. This approach makes sense if the basic precept of morality is a self-
evident, analytic proposition that is the only possible principle of moral autonomy.
Kant's view that the analysis of morality yields a unique, substantive moral prin-
ciple has always had its critics. I will not try to support further or establish this
characteristic Kantian claim here. My only point now is that in Kant's view an
analytic moral principle, arrived at through conceptual analysis, can yield substan-
tive moral conclusions. Hence, in interpreting Kant we must look elsewhere for an
account of the CI's being synthetic.
Section I of this paper has introduced and defined the issues. In Section II, I will
develop the rational intuitionist interpretation of the synthetic a priori character of
the CI. In Section III I will critique that interpretation by showing that Kant re-
jected it. In Section IV I will isolate the core practical synthetic a priori proposi-
tion, according to the motivational interpretation. Section V will argue that our
moral nature includes the motivational capacity to act from purely moral motives,
according to Kant. Section VI will discuss passages from some of Kant's later
works on moral philosophy, Religion Within the Limits ofReason Alone and Meta-
physics ofMorals, and show how they support the motivational interpretation.
II.
W. D. Ross in The Right and the Good states his well-known list of prima facie
duties, a list that includes six distinct items. He then adds, "It is a prima facie clas-
sification of the duties which reflection on our moral convictions seems actually to
reveal. And if these convictions are, as I would claim they are, of the nature of
knowledge...the list will be a list of authentic conditional duties.',I2 Later, ex-
pounding on the nature of this moral knowledge he writes,
II See Groundwork of !he Melaphysics of Morals, IV, 440 - 444; Crilique of Praclical Rea-
son, V, 39-41.
12 Sir David Ross, The Right and the Good, Oxford: Clarendon, 1967 p. 23.
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The moral order expressed in these propositions is just as much part of the fundamental
nature of the universe (and, we may add, of any possible universe in which there were
moral agents at all) as is the spatial or numerical structure expressed in the axioms of
geometry or arithmetic. In our confidence that these propositions are true there is in-
volved the same trust in our reason that is involved in our confidence in mathe-
matics.. .In both cases we are dealing with propositions that cannot be proved, but that
just as certainly need no proof. 13
In describing his own views, Ross does not call these propositions synthetic a
priori. But in discussing Kant's views on the categorical imperative in his later
book Kant's Ethical Theory, he does indicate approval for such a description. Dis-
cussing Kant's claim that we cannot ascertain empirically whether there are any
categorical imperatives, Ross writes,
Now it is true that we cannot by experience, i.e., by sense-perception or by introspec-
tion, discover (for example) that to break a promise is wrong. Wrongness and rightness
are not attributes that can be experienced, i.e., just found, to be present in a given sub-
ject. But it is possible, by reflection on what we mean when we say that promises should
not be broken, to discover that we mean...that the breaking of them has a perfectly
distinct character which we express by the word 'wrong' ... 14
Ross continues:
As in the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant thinks that a special difficulty attaches to the
possibility of knowing any synthetic a priori propositions; and he rightly [my emphasis]
describes moral laws as being of this nature. But there is no more mystery about the
knowledge of synthetic then about the knowledge of analytic propositions. Given the
possibility of the unique thing called knowledge, then if there are necessary synthetic
connexions between different elements in reality, there is no more reason why these
should not be known than why the correct analysis of wholes into their elements should
not be known. 15
Ross here describes his own conception of prima facie duties and Kant's categori-
cal imperative in similar fashion. He even accepts as correct the Kantian descrip-
tion of moral laws as synthetic a priori propositions. In both cases Ross thinks
we are dealing with insights that have the character of axioms: basic, intuitive, un-
provable truths. Thus Ross agrees with Kant about the status of moral principles,
and their correctness, so far as they go. His main quarrel with Kant is on a differ-
ent matter: Kant thinks all duties can be derived from a single principle, whereas
Ross thinks we need at least six distinct sources of prima facie duties. 16 Following
Sigdwick's terminology, we can describe Ross as a principle intuitionist, who
thinks that there are a plurality of such moral intuitions. In Ross's interpretation
13 Ibid., pp. 29 - 30.
14 Sir David Ross, Kant's Ethical Theory, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1954, p. 41.
IS Ibid., p. 42.
16 Ibid., pp. 22, 28 - 29.
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Kant also emerges as a principle intuitionist, but with only a single intuition.17
Both Ross himself and Kant, according to Ross's interpretation, are "rational intui-
tionists," in the sense mentioned in Section I.
Most rational intuitionists think human knowledge of objective moral reality is
only contingently related to human motives. Intuitionists thus tend to be motiva-
tional extemalists.18 In an intuitionist picture the facts which justify moral proposi-
tions are objective ones which may have nothing directly to do with human inter-
ests and desires; hence justifying reasons and motivating reasons tend to be dis-
tinct. Indeed, the risk of intemalism, Frankena writes, is that it may "trim obliga-
tion to the size of individual motives.,,19
Let us develop Ross's understanding of prima facie duties somewhat further.
Take the example of duties of fidelity. Ross's idea seems to be that the basic char-
acteristic of moral requiredness attaches synthetically to certain kinds of acts, in-
cluding all examples of promise-keeping.2o The attachment is furthermore a priori,
17 In fact on p. 21 of Kant's Ethical Theory, Ibid., Ross tells us that "Kant's view is one
variety of intuitionism." It seems natural to suggest that Ross arrives at his interpretation of
this aspect of Kant's ethical theory based on his own understanding of how moral theory
proceeds; he finds Kant to be a kindred deontological principle intuitionist.
Henry Sidgwick. The Methods of Ethics, Seventh edition, reprinted by Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1907, pp. 100 -102, develops a related three fold distinction, distinguishing
between two versions of what I have called "principle intuitionism," "Dogmatic" and "Phi-
losophical."
18 For one of the classic discussions of the contrasts between motivational externalism and
internalism, see William D. Frankena. "Obligation and Motivation in Recent Moral Philoso-
phy," in: A.I. Melden, ed: Essays in Moral Philosophy, Seattle: University of Washington
Press, 1958, pp. 40 - 80. A more recent discussion of the same issues is found in Chapter 3 of
Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics, by David O. Brink. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1989.
19 Frankena (op.cit. fn. 18), p. 80.
I mention here four other interpreters, some of whom may be representatives of the ra-
tional intuitionist view.
H.J. Paton. in The Categorical Imperative, Hutchinson of London. 1947, on pp. 246-8.
writes of the "direct insight" we have into the principle of autonomy and the associated im-
perative.
John Marshall. ''The Syntheticity of the Categorical Imperative," pp. 185 - 200. from Pro-
ceedings: Sixth International Kant Congress, The Pennsylvania State University, 1985, ed.
Gerhard Funke IThomas M. Seebohm, copyright 1989, Volume Il/2, Washington: University
Press of America, emphasizes the syntheticity of the main claims Kant makes in the Grundle-
gung.
M.H. McCanhy. "Kant's Application of the Analytic I Synthetic Distinction to Impera-
tives" in: Dialogue, 1979, 18,373 - 391, and "Kant's Rejection of the Argument of Ground-
work III," in Kant-Studien, 1982, 73, 169 - 180. McCarthy claims that the categorical impera-
tive can be understood as synthetic only because it is understood as affirming the necessita-
tion of the will of an imperfectly rational being; hence it would not be synthetic if it affirmed
the moral law as applicable to a holy will.
Mark TImmons. "Necessitation and Justification in Kant's Ethics," pp. 223-261 in Cana-
dian Journal of Philosophy 22:2, June 1992. It is difficult briefly to characterize the views in
this essay, which is in part a response to McCarthy.
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in the sense that we understand that this requiredness attaches to the kind of act,
and to this specific act, which exemplifies that kind, only through an act of reflec-
tion; such requiredness is not a sensible quality, nor does Ross postulate anything
like an inner moral sense. In this instance the synthetic a priori proposition is:
"Promise-keeping is required," which also presents us with the paradigmatic form
of moral principle: a subject-term referring to a kind of act of which we may have
experience, and a predicate-term referring to a moral characteristic that attaches to
this action. This, I suggest, is the model for moral judgment both for Ross and for
Ross' interpretation of Kant.
III.
The difficulty with the rational intuitionist interpretation of the CI is that Kant
strongly rejected the rationalist tradition. This is clearest in one of Kant's best
known letters, to Marcus Herz of 21 February 1772.21 Kant writes this letter while
he is thinking through the project of the Critique of Pure Reason, though he has
not yet arrived at his "Copernican revolution" solution. But the ground rules as to
what will constitute an acceptable solution are all the clearer because this solution
is not yet in hand. His problem, Kant writes, is, "On what ground rests the relation
of that in us which is called representation to the object?,,22 In some cases the
object causes the representation, as in sense perception. In other cases the represen-
tation causes the object, "as when Divine knowledge is conceived as the archetype
of all things.'023 (There is an echo of this idea in the first Critique's idea of intellec-
tual intuition, understood as a power that brings a thing into existence by cogniz-
ing it.24) But in the case of a priori concepts (which include both the concepts of
central interest in the first Critique, and moral concepts), neither of these relations
can be correct. Then Kant explains what he thinks are obviously unsatisfactory
resolutions of the issue:
20 The kind of requiredness is prima facie, not toti-resultant requiredness. Notice that pri-
ma facie requiredness remains a characteristic of an action, even when it is overridden by
contrary considerations. For example, A breaks a promise to meet a friend in order to render
emergency assistance at an accident; the fact that the obligation to provide assistance is over-
riding does not mean that the prima facie obligatoriness of promise keeping disappears.
21 The translation is by Arne Unhjem, in: Lewis White Beck, Studies in the Philosophy of
Kant 1965, Indianapolis: The Bobbs MerrilI Company. Quotes from this letter are folIowed
by references in the text that give first the page of the passage in this book by Beck. The
same letter is in Arnulf Zweig, editor and translator, Kant: Philosophical Correspondence,
1759-1799, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967. The letter is in the Akademie edi-
tion, X, 130 ff. There is a specific echo of the sorts of contrasts found in this letter in KeV
AnI B125, and in the references in KeV to the idea of intelIectua1 intuition (e.g., B68). As I
will urge below, the doctrines of the first Critique are fulIy in keeping with the ideas ex-
pressed in this letter.
22 Letters in Akadamie edition, X, 130.
23 Ibid.
24 See Critique of Pure Reason, A87 - 81 B65.
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Plato assumed a previous intuition of Divinity as the primary source of the pure con-
cepts of the understanding and of first principles. Mallebranche [sic] believed in a still
effective eternal intuition of this Primary Being. Various moralists have accepted pre-
cisely this view with respect to basic moral laws. Crusius believed in certain implanted
rules for the purpose of forming judgments, together with the concepts which God - to
the extent to which they are necessary to harmonize with things - implanted in the hu-
man soul. Of these systems one may call the former the influxum hyperphysicum, and
the latter the harmoniam praestabilitam intellectualem. But the Deus ex machina in the
determination of the origin and validity of our knowledge is the greatest absurdity one
could hit upon, and has - besides its deceptive circle in the closing link of reasoning of
our human perceptions - also this disadvantage that it provokes all sorts of fancy ideas
and every pious and speculative sort of brainstorm.25
His ironical Latin phrases for these conceptions, the Platonic "hyperphysical in-
flux" and the rationalist "intellectual preestablished harmony," together with the
reference to the Deus ex machina make it clear that he rejects the rationalist / intui-
tionist tradition that he is presenting. This rejection is all the more striking because
he had stated contrary views two years earlier in his Inaugural Dissertation. Kant's
concluding statement points out the unhappy consequence of allowing such unsup-
portable claims to knowledge: If we fail to discipline our knowledge claims
through an awareness of our limitations, we open ourselves to wild claims of
"fancy ideas" and "pious brainstorms." Given these statements it would be surpris-
ing if Kant were a rational intuitionist in his moral philosophy.26 .
In the first Critique Kant discusses three other kinds of synthetic a priori propo-
sitions: (i) mathematical propositions; (ii) principles of nature, that lie at the a
priori basis of natural science and our knowledge of the empirical world; and (iii)
the propositions of traditional metaphysics. According to the Critique, what is the
character of our knowledge of each of these kinds of synthetic a priori?
(i) Mathematical propositions are known because of their basis in the a priori
form of sensible intuition that is universal among human beings. Intuition is what
enables us to join subject and predicate, and, for example, to know that a two-
sided plane figure is not a possible spatial construction?? Is this discussion of in-
tuition Platonic, perhaps recalling the slave boy passage in the Meno? Is the Kant-
ian doctrine of pure intuition of space and time an example of rational intuitionism
in Kant's philosophy? No, for several reasons. (a) For Kant the "reality" appre-
hended is internal rather than external, a point expressed by the well-known Kant-
25 Letters in Akademie.edition, X, 131. In Beck (op.cit. fn. 21) see pp. 232 - 33.
26 Henry Allison, Kant's Theory of Freedom, Cambridge/New York: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1990, p. 232, also talks about the problems of attributing an "intuitionist" view to
Kant, citing Beck, who expresses similar difficulties. The intuitionist view Allison discusses
has to do with Kant's characterizations of the "fact of pure reason" as either subjective or
objective. See Beck's "The Fact of Reason: An Essay on Justification in Ethics," in: Studies
in the Philosophy of Kant, Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965, pp. 200 - 214.
27 Compare Critique of Pure Reason, A47 - 49/ B65 - 66.
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ian doctrine that space and time are empirically real and transcendentally ideal.
(b) The doctrine of the aesthetic concerns the form of sensibility; hence it has to do
with sense perception rather than the rational apprehension independent of sense
that is the rational intuitionist/Platonic paradigm. (c) The knowledge of these
forms of sensibility found in mathematics is itself indirect, obtained only through
the procedures characteristic of mathematics, which according to Kant are con-
structions in space and time, and proofs. (d) Finally, the forms of intuition are
purely formal. If one objects that "transcendentally ideal" is just Kant's term for
"innate," Kant would probably urge in his defense that traditional innate ideas are
material, whereas a priori concepts and intuitions are merely the form of the em-
pirical elements of our knowledge of appearances. Whether this formal/material
distinction, which runs all through Kant's philosophy, is defensible, I do not here
judge. But Kant's idea is that the formal elements of experience are supplied by
the mind. Hence Kant does not think that sensible intuitions are templates of an
external reality.
(ii) The principles that are the subject of the "Transcendental Analytic" are
proved true by being shown to be necessary conditions of the possibility of experi-
ence. They are thus not directly intuited to be true, but rather proved through an
indirect and discursive argument that Kant calls "transcendental." So again, there
is no rationally intuitive apprehension of essences, but rather an indirect inference
based on (analytic) argument and conceptual analysis, which leads Kant to claim
that experience presupposes them.
(iii) Finally, Kant rejects the claims to have metaphysical knowledge precisely
because they would be instances of the rational intuitive knowledge of external
rational essences, and no such claims can be sustained. All such arguments to me-
taphysical conclusions are non-sequiturs ("Paralogisms," "Ideal of Pure Reason")
or lead to contradictions ("Antinomies"), which is a symptom of their being based
on false premises.
Hence none of the synthetic a priori propositions in the first Critique are known
by the rational intuition that Kant rejects. Kant thinks that the appropriate method
of philosophy is simply conceptual analysis.28
In the first Critique Kant wrote the following against the recent use of "postu-
late," where it meant treating a proposition as immediately certain, withoutjustifi-
cation or proof. Ross's idea that we may have synthetic a priori intuitions or ax-
ioms that are self-evident and incapable of proof could equally well be the target
of Kant's criticism:
[I)f, in dealing with synthetic propositions, we are to recognise them as possessing un-
conditioned validity, independently of deduction, on the evidence [merely) of their own
28 See KrV, 'The Discipline of Pure Reason," in the "Methodology," A708/B736ff. See
L W. Beck, "Kant's Theory of Definition," in op. cit., fn. 21. This conception of philosophy is
found in Kant as early as the "Prize Essay" (1763).
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claims, then no matter how evident they may be, all critique of understanding is given
up. And since there is no lack of audacious pretensions, and these are supported by com-
mon belief (though that is no credential of their truth), the understanding lies open to
every fancy, and is in no position to withhold approval of those assertions which, though
illegitimate, yet press upon us, in the same confident tone, their claims to be accepted as
actual axioms. Whenever, therefore, an a priori determination is synthetically added to
the concept of a thing, it is indispensable that, if not a proof, at least a deduction of the
legitimacy of such an assertion should be supplied?9
Kant made approximately the same point more poetically in the Introduction: "The
light dove, cleaving the air in her free flight, and feeling its resistance, might
imagine that her flight would be still easier in empty space.,,30 Clearly Kant's anti-
rationalism is not limited to the 1772 letter to Herz.
Kant uses "metaphysics" in two senses: there is the old, bad, rationalistic meta-
physics that he rejects, and his own, new metaphysics, found in titles like Meta-
physics ofMorals. The Kantian metaphysics rejects all a priori knowledge of exter-
nal reality, and gives us a doctrine of the internal workings of the mind, as re-
vealed in the formal aspects of our concepts. Hence, though Kantian new metaphy-
sics is retained, the old rationalist metaphysics is gone.
The transcendental arguments of the first Critique are not the only indirect argu-
ments. Kant's argument for the CI is indirect in a similar way, according to the
authoritative account of the "fact of pure reason" in the second Critique. We are
directly aware only of the various moral phenomena of consciousness such as feel-
ings of guilt and indignation that Kant thinks presuppose the validity of the CI, and
hence also presuppose our freedom, and we infer from them the validity of the CI
for us, and also the proposition that is implied by it, that we are free?l
Let me give a brief, rough sketch of the kind of synthetic a priori proposition the
practical synthetic a priori proposition is, a sketch that anticipates the interpreta-
tion offered in the next two sections. It is not like the propositions of the Aesthetic
or the Analytic of the first Critique, since it has nothing directly to do with experi-
ence. It is more like the synthetic a priori propositions discussed in the Dialectic,
in that it is a product of Reason, in the sense in which that faculty is opposed to the
faculty of Understanding. However, it is not a theoretical proposition, but a practi-
29 Critique of Pure Reason, A233 - 34/ B285 - 86.
30 Ibid., A5/ B8.
31 I do not mean to suggest that the doctrine of the fact of pure reason is clear, straightfor-
ward, and problem-free. The interpretation of Chapter III of the Grundlegung is, if anything,
even more difficult and complex, so I have not attempted at all to address it here. Obviously,
however, the topics of the present paper and of these passages where Kant, by different
routes, seeks to justify the CI are linked topics. Here I can only suggest that if one comes
armed with a correct interpretation of the status of the synthetic a priori practical proposition
of Kant's moral philosophy, one would have a considerable advantage in trying to understand
these difficult passages.
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cal proposition. where. as Kant said in the letter to Herz. the representation causes
the object. Such a thing happens in human beings only via a choice. a bringing to
bear of incentives. a commitment to pursuit of an end. and finally. when and where
appropriate. action. We can know the proposition. in a practical respect, because
we know its effects. which are the phenomena referred to in the discussions of the
fact of pure reason. These consequential phenomena give us insight into the nature
of the moral law. and so. in this one instance. we can come to know a noumenal
proposition. a law offreedom.
IV.
The rational intuitionist interpretation of the categorical imperative as a moral
axiom is unsatisfactory because it makes Kant out to be inconsistent with his own
deeply held beliefs about the limits of human knowledge. Let us begin developing
a more satisfactory interpretation by identifying the core element of the categorical
imperative that best exhibits its synthetic a priori character.
In Chapter Two of the Grundlegung, shortly after informing us that the categori-
cal imperative is synthetic a priori. Kant writes.
There is therefore only a single categorical imperative and it is this: 'Act only on that
maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal
law.· 32
Usually only sentences in the indicative are said to be synthetic a priori; here Kant
tells us an imperative is. Since Kant tells us that "imperatives are expressed by an
'ought....33 we may rewrite this one accordingly. which will give us an indicative
in (A). below. Let us also bring out the imperative's implied subject by supposing
it addressed, as Kant says34. to rational beings. but let us understand them to be
finite beings rather like us humans. Thus we get:
(A) A rational being ought to act on a maxim only if she can at the same time will that
it should become a universal law.35
Also. let us alter the predicate of (A) so that we may concentrate on the issues of
present interest. In Chapter One of the Grundlegung, Kant analyzes the concept of
a good will. arguing that a good will acts only from the motive of duty. and that the
principle of actions from the motive of duty is the purely formal principle of action
32 Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, IV, 421.
33 Ibid., IV. 413.
34 Ibid.• IV, 420n. 426 -7, 435, 440; Critique of Practical Reason, V, 46; Religion Within
the Limits of Reason Alone, VI, 26 - 28; 21 -23.
35 This proposition (A) is folJowed below by versions (B) and (C). However, (A) is al-
ready a synthetic a priori proposition. which already contains alJ the moral "substance" built
into the CI. (B) and (C) are merely implications or presuppositions of (A), designed to make
aspects of the character of (A) more perspicuous.
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that is stated by the "universal law" formulation of the categorical imperative, i.e.,
the formulation quoted in (A). This principle is the only purely formal principle, in
the sense that it is detached from all personal material ends of human action.
36
The
point of this analysis is to discover the principle that is present and active in ac-
tions that well exhibit this moral quality of personality. Chapter One's result may
be summed up in the following proposition:
(Gl) "A good will is a will which always acts only on that maxim which can at the
same time be willed as a universallaw.,,37
"Good will" is, then, a term for the positively developed moral nature of persons.
Remember that Kant is assuming the existence of morality in the first two chapters
of the Grundlegung, and undertaking to justify it only in the third and last chapter.
An agent's capacity to develop a good will we may call a person's "moral na-
ture.,,38 "Moral nature" is thus a concept that stands at the starting point of Kantian
analysis. Let us restate (A) by substituting "moral nature" for the universal law
principle that appears at the end of the analytic process. We then get:
(B) A rational being has a moral nature.39
This proposition, then, is synthetic a priori.
36 For a more detailed presentation of this view, see the author's "The Argument of Kant's
Grundlegung, Chapter One," in Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume, No.
I, Part I (1975), pp. 73 - 92. A very similar reading of the argument of Kant's Chapter One is
given in a later essay by Christine M. Korsgaard, "Kant's Analysis of Obligation: The Argu-
ment of Foundations I," The Monist, July 1989,72:3, pp. 311- 340.
37 See the author's essay, op. cit. fn. 36, p. 80.
38 I think that "good will" is an individual's moral nature, plus the fact that in this indi-
vidual that nature has been cultivated and given priority among the agent's motivations.
Hence a good will can be possessed only by an individual who was in some sense morally
good. "Moral nature" is presumably possessed by all humans, or more broadly, all finite ra-
tional beings, but only in an individual possessing good will would this moral nature exhibit
itself in action sufficiently to be analyzed. Such analysis reveals that the principle of the
agent's action is the universal law principle, which is the supreme principle of morality. For a
more detailed discussion of various issues concerning good will, see Karl Ameriks, "Kant on
the Good Will," in: Otfried Hoffe, ed: Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten: Ein koopera-
tiver Kommentar, Franfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1989.
39 Notice the radical difference between the two models of ethical propositions being used
by the rational intuitionist and the motivational interpretations. Ross's version of rational
intuitionism takes the subjects of ethical propositions to be actions, thought of descriptively,
and without reference to motives, and their predicates to be non-natural moral qualities that
reflection tells us attach to these actions. According to proposition (B), which formulates an
intermediate stage of my analysis of Kant's view, according to the motivational interpreta-
tion, the subject of the proposition is rational beings or persons, and the predicate mentions a
set of cognitive and motivational characteristics of such individuals (their "moral natures")
that, so far as we can tell, could fail to be possessed by subject-concept persons without con-
tradiction. Kant is often read as focusing in a primary way upon acts, like Ross, but the moti-
vational interpretation disputes that reading. Korsgaard's "Kant's Analysis of Obligation:
The Argument of Foundations I", op. cit. fn. 36, draws a similar contrast between moral Sen-
The Synthetic A Priori Proposition 449
One of the clearest textual confinnations that Kant wished to affinn (B) comes
from Religion, where he writes about the "Original Predisposition to Good in Hu-
man Nature":
We may conveniently divide this predisposition, with respect to function, into three divi-
sions, to be considered as elements in the fixed definition of man:
(1) The predisposition to animality in man, taken as a living being;
(2) The predisposition to humanity in man, taken as a living and at the same time a
rational being;
(3) The predisposition to personality in man, taken as a rational and at the same time an
accountable being.4o
In a very significant footnote to the end of this passage Kant explains,
We cannot regard this [the third predisposition] as included in the concept of the preced-
ing, but necessarily must treat it as a special predisposition. For from the fact that a
being has reason it by no means follows that this reason, by the mere representing of the
fitness of its maxims to be laid down as universal laws, is thereby rendered capable of
determining choice (Willkiir) unconditionally, so as to be "practical" of itself; at least
not so far as we can see.41
We can now understand why the categorical imperative itself, and our derivation
from it, (B), should be regarded as synthetic: there is no contradiction in imagining
an otherwise rational being lacking the power to determine choice independently
of heteronomous incentives.
Kant presents what seems to be an identical view in the Grundlegunl2 as he
seeks to explain why the categorical imperative is synthetic a priori:
Here we have a practical proposition in which the willing of an action is not derived
analytically from some other willing already presupposed [as in actions governed by
hypothetical imperatives] (for we do not possess any such perfect will), but is on the
contrary connected immediately with the concept of the will of a rational being as some-
thing which is not contained in this concept.
This characterization of "a rational being" is at least consistent with the quota-
tions from Religion. 43 Both Grundlegung passages emphasize the unconditional
character of the moral imperative, i.e., the absence of a hypothetical condition.
44
timentalism, which constructs morality from the perspective of a spectator or judge, and Ra-
tionalists like Kant (Korsgaard is using the term in a different sense than I am), whose ap-
proach is agent-centered; Ross's approach resembles that of Sentimentalism in the sense that
it is spectator-centered.
40 Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, VI, 26n; 21 n.
41 Ibid. Henry Allison, in Kant's Theory of Freedom, op. cit. fn. 26, p. 149, quo~es this
same passage, characterizing it as "a highly significant footnote ..." He returns to thiS foot-
note, quoting it again to make a point on p. 206.
42 Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, IV, 420n.
43 See also Ibid., IV, 426 for a similar passage.
29 Jahrbuch fur Recht und Ethik, Bd. 5 (1997)
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Hence a rational being is a being capable of (i) theoretical ratiocination, and
knowledge of a phenomenal world, as described in the first Critique, and also
capable of (ii) practical reasoning about desire fulfillment, and means-ends rela-
tions of the sort that get embodied in hypothetical imperatives. But, so far as we
can tell, it may lack (iii), the power of being moved by purely moral considera-
tions, and hence of being directly moved to act on categorical imperatives.
Why should (B) be regarded as also a priori? At a general level, we can say that
the concepts of rational being and moral nature are likely to be regarded by Kant
as a priori concepts, with the synthetic connection between them unlikely to be
based merely on experience. More specifically, in the next Section we will find
that "moral nature" includes a motivational element, viz., the power of acting from
the motive of duty. This power is the power of our moral will to be the cause of
action; in action from duty the CI is the principle that motivationally determines
the action. Such an unconditional cause (dependent on no pre-existing desire the
agent may happen to have) is a free cause, which violates the conditions of possi-
ble experience; any statement that claims such a causal/motivational power for a
person Would not be empirical but a priori. Kant's presentation and resolution of
the third antinomy excluded such free causes from the phenomenal, but left open
the possibility that there might be such free causes noumenally.45
44 The unconditional character of categorical imperatives distinguishes them from the
I?eas of Reason in the Antinomies of the first Critique, each of which present series of condi-
t~ons that cannot have a first unconditioned member (according to the arguments of the an-
titheses) and also cannot have a completed infinite series of conditions (according to the
~guments of the theses). The next section of this paper will show that the conditions being
discussed are causal-motivational conditions. Once Kant determined to his own satisfaction
~hat ~orality was based on unconditional precepts and motivations that mirrored the precepts
In t?:lr unconditionality, i.e., was based on categorical imperatives, he would have been in a
poSitIOn at once to conclude that moral freedom has to be extra-phenomenal, since the phe-
nomenal World could never contain such an unconditional motive.
45 A prominent Kantian text conflicts with the interpretation proposed in this Section. The
text occu~s . in the third paragraph of Chapter Three of the Grundlegung. Kant proposes to
state exphcltly what the synthetic a priori proposition to be justified in Chapter Three is:
.. , [T]he principle of morality is still a synthetic proposition, namely: "An absolutely
gD?d will is one whose maxims can always have as its content itself considered as a
universal law"; for we cannot discover this characteristic of its maxim by analyzing the
. concept of an absolutely good will. (G, IV, 447)
!t IS hard to make sense of this statement. The proposition that Kant says is synthetic a priori
IS, or seems to be, the same one that Kant's argument of Chapter One of the Grundlegung
att~mpted to show to be an analytic proposition. That is, Chapter One is best read as an anal-
YS.ls of t~e concept of a good will to discover the principle operative in actions that exhibit
thls"qu~ht~. and the analysis results in the discovery and initial statement of the "universal
law pnncIple. I can make no sense of the above statement. Here I'll just make three com-
ments, eac~ of which may have some ameliorating effect.
(I) It mIght be suggested (and Allison pursues this line, though he does not put it this
w~y!. that the issue in this statement is not the connection of subject ("an absolutely good
wdl ) and predicate ("one whose maxim can as its content itself be considered as a universal
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Pan IV yielded us:
(B) A rational being has a moral nature,
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as a statement of the central synthetic a priori proposition embedded in the CI. But
we need to consider more precisely what it means to have a moral nature. The
element of greatest interest is the claim that the agent has the motivational power
to act from purely moral motives. It is this motivational claim that at last gives a
full account of the categorical imperative as synthetic a priori, and that also pre-
sents Kant as a motivational intemalist.
To have a moral nature, first, means to be subject to the moral law in the sense
of being morally responsible for one's actions. At times Kant seems to use "ac-
countable" and "moral" as synonyms.46
Second, to have a moral nature would include being aware of moral principles,
and on occasion judging one's own and others' actions by moral principles, per-
haps on occasion feeling guilt, indignation, and other moral feelings. Kant dis-
cusses moral emotions, in particular "respect (Achtung)," as an important ethical
I~w"), but the existence of beings who are in possession of a good will. After all, in Aristote-
han syllogistic, the existence of S's in "All S is P" is assumed, permitting an inference from
"All S is P" to "Some S is P" that is not permitted in modem logic, which does not assume
the existence of items answering to the subject term. (Kant states this doctrine in Section 46
of Jiische's Logic, see pp. 121 - 2 in the translation by Robert Hartman and Wolfgang
Schwarz, Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1974.) The statement that some S's exist, arguably
part of the meaning of the problem proposition, is clearly synthetic, thus making the entire
Proposition synthetic. But this suggestion contradicts the explanation of the syntheticity of
the proposition that Kant gives directly after the problem passage.
(2) This statement is a problem for any interpretation of the issue in this paper that I am
~amiliar with. All the interpreters I am aware of are troubled by it, because on any reasonable
mterpretation it seems to be analytic, not synthetic. Hence, if we take it seriously, it cuts
equally against any view of the texts yet devised. Allison discusses this passage in Kant's
Theory of Freedom, op. cit. fn. 26, p. 226. Paton discussed it on pp. 201 - 2 of The Categori-
cal Imperative, op. cit. fn. 9. Both Allison and Paton are also puzzled by the passage and try
to explain it away, as I do. Korsgaard calls this a "misstatement" in "Kant's Analysis of Ob-
ligation", op. cit. fn. 36, p. 339, endnote 57.
(3) A simple change in the proposition would make it into a bona fide synthetic a priori
moral proposition: substituting "rational being" for "good will." Perhaps this was Kant's er-
ror, his "slip of the concept" - we can't quite call it a slip of the pen. There is another place
in the Grundlegung itself where Kant seems to be making the same kind of point as in our
problem passage:
Our question therefore is this: "Is it a necessary law for all rational beings [Kant's em-
phasis} always to judge their actions by reference to those maxims of which they can
themselves will that they should serve as universal laws?" If there is such a law, it must
already by connected (entirely a priori) with the concept of the will of a rational being
as such. (G, IV, 426)
Here the subject of the proposition is "a rational being" rather than "an absolutely good will."
46 See Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, VI, 26 - 28; 21- 23.
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concept.47 We are conscious of a "moral law within,,48; this consciousness in all its
elements constitutes the "fact of pure reason" that Kant uses in the second Critique
to argue for our freedom, and hence the validity of the moral law. Kant's lectures
on education tell us that the moral law is in each of us, and needs only to be led out
and brought to full consciousness by an educational process of the proper sort.49
Third, and most important, to have a moral nature is to be capable of acting
from purely moral motives. If this motivational power is part of the very concept
of moral nature in Kant's view, Kant is a motivational internalist in the sense men-
tioned earlier. In fact, Kant appears to be internalist in a strong sense: he believes
that purely moral motivation must be adequate to assure, even in the face of con-
trary sensible motivations, that performing the morally required action is in our
power.
Let us look at some of the evidence. Throughout the Grundlegung Kant is con-
cerned with moral motivation when he is discussing the categorical imperative.
For example, at the beginning of Chapter Two, when he is considering whether
morality may not be a "phantom of the human imagination"So, the question he con-
siders is whether a morally motivated action has ever been performed. And when
in Chapter Two he raises the question of whether the categorical imperative is
"possible," he seems to be asking a question about the possibility of moral motiva-
tion.S1 Again, his discussion of autonomy is largely in terms of motivation; autono-
my is the will's self-determination, and heteronomy is determination by something
outside the will.s2 Also, in the second Critique the central question is said to be:
Can pure reason be practical? And if pure reason can be practical, this means that
"...of itself and independently of everything empirical it [i.e., pure reason] can
determine the will."s3 So again and again the issue concerns, not merely making a
correct moral judgment, but "determination of the will." The categorical impera-
tive is a principle, not just in the sense of being a basic "Satz" and thus a "Grund-
satz", but also in the sense of being a causal principle of explanation. Analogously,
gravity or the law of gravitation might be said to be a physical principle which
may be invoked to explain physical phenomena.s4
47 Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, IV, 400; Critique of Practical Reason, V,
71 ff.
48 Critique of Practical Reason, V, 29 - 30; 161.
49 Akademie, IX, 437 - 500.
50 Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, IV, 407.
51 Ibid., IV, 417 - 420.
52 Ibid., IV, 431, 433.
53 Critique of Practical Reason, V, 42.
54 Henry Allison emphasizes that the moral law is a sort of causal law, though he does not
connect this claim with the thesis that the categorical imperative is synthetic a priori. Allison
writes, "... [T]his characterization of the moral law as a causal law is crucial for Kant be-
cause he also holds that freedom as a mode of causality can be thought determinately only if
a law (modus operandi) of such causality can be given. Since the moral law is just such a
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In the general introduction to the Metaphysics ofMorals, Kant writes,
Every legislation (Gesetzgebung) contains two elements (whether it prescribes external
or internal actions, and whether it prescribes these a priori by mere reason or by the
choice of another person): first, a law, which sets forth as objectively necessary the ac-
tion that ought to take place, i.e., which makes the action a duty; secondly, a motive,
which joins a ground determining choice to this action subjectively with the thought of
the law. Hence the second element consists in this: that the law makes the duty into the
motive. The first presents an action as a duty, and this is a merely theoretical recognition
of a possible determination of the power of choice, i.e., of a practical rule. The second
connects the obligation to act in this way with a ground for determining the subject's
power of choice as such.55
Kant then distinguishes between ethical legislation where duty is also the motive,
and juridical, where an external motivation, the provision of punishment for viola-
tions, is the only motive. We don't have ethical legislation unless both the law and
the motive are available.
In a discussion of "equivocal rights" Kant discusses the "right of necessity.',56
FOllowing a shipwreck, a man floating in the water finds another who saved him-
self by clinging to a large piece of wood. He knocks him away, causing him to
drown, and takes possession of the piece of wood for himself, thereby saving him-
self. The first man has murdered the second, and yet in this instance, if the first
had not killed the second by taking possession of the wood for himself, the first
would surely have drowned. Since the penalty for murder is also death, the law in
such a case is unable to provide a superior incentive for obeying the law, since no
penalty is more severe than death. In such a case the law is subjectively not a law
at all, because it fails to provide an adequate incentive. Kant for this reason reluc-
tantly concludes that a person who exercises this "right of necessity" should not be
punished.57
In these passages the same concerns provide philosophical motivation for Kant
as for contemporary internalists: if moral obligation is to be practically effective, it
must have motivation internal to itself that will help or assure that the fact of the
moral duty makes a difference in action. Moral precepts can be no more valid with-
out incentives than criminal laws can be valid and effective without provision for
punishment for violators. Kant knew the work of British moralists like Hutcheson
law, it provides positive content to the idea of an intelligible or noumenal causality, which
reason requires in its theoretical function." Kant's Theory of Freedom, op. cit. fn. 26, p. 244.
See also pp. 239, 241, 248.
55 Metaphysics of Morals, VI, 218.
56 Ibid., VI, 235 - 6; the same case is mentioned in "Theory and Practice," VIII, 300n.
57 Only the law fails here. Kant thinks the survivor is still morally speaking a murderer.
The incentive provided by the law, since it is empirical, is somewhat uncertain; in other cases
the legal incentive may fail because the state and its legal system collapse, or because the
criminal anticipates not being caught. The inner moral incentive, however, will have no such
empirical failures, as the present case illustrates.
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and Hume, who were intemalists, and he was influenced by them. His criticism of
British sentimentalism as represented by Hutcheson was that since it required the
presence of an empirical psychological motivating principle, whose presence as
empirical could only be contingently provided for, it undermined the necessity of
the moral ought, making it equally contingent. If one were a motivational intemal-
ist about ethical obligation, the result would be, Frankena writes, that one would
have to "trim obligation to the size of individual motives,,,s8 and this characteriza-
tion would fit Hutcheson and an intemalist like Falk. But Kant, with his insistence
that the agent act from the motive of duty, aims to escape this contingency. The
reasons that justify performing an action, committing oneself to an end, or even
committing oneself to giving priority to morality over self-interest in one's entire
life, are also the motivating reasons in action from duty. Indeed, in action from
duty justifying and motivating reasons are identical. The fact that we have the
power so to act is the same as the fact that we are frees9.
When Kant introduces his famous principle (in Religion) that 'ought' implies
'can,' he does not use it, as almost all recent discussions of the principle do, in the
contrapositive. He uses it as stated, to mean that my awareness of an obligation
implies that I have the power to undertake the obligation.6O
Let us return to our earlier formulation of the synthetic a priori proposition that
lies at the core of the categorical imperative:
(B) A rational being has a moral nature.
We have been investigating more closely what having a moral nature consists in.
Our main conclusion is that Kant thinks that to have a moral nature is to have the
power to perform our moral duties from purely moral motives. This is not a small
or easily validated claim; to have the power to act from the motive of duty is to
have a power to initiate actions that have no motivational basis in any personal
wish, want or desire. The logical model of the categorical imperative is the model
58 Frankena. op. cit. fn. 18, p. 80.
59 See Metaphysics of Morals, VI, 226 - 27.
60 My colleague Mark van Roojen suggested that Kant's motivational intemalism is clos-
ely related to his acceptance of "Ought implies can." Unless there is an assured moral motive
(one that is more than merely contingently connected with obligation), the agent might not
have the power to perform her obligation, which would by "Ought implies can" mean she
would not have the obligation.
Van Roojen also states the contrast between what I am calling the rational intuitionist and
the motivational interpretation of the synthetic a priori character of the CI, as follows: Ac-
cording to the motivational interpretation it isn't the content of the obligation that makes the
CI synthetic. Kant thinks you can deduce the content of the CI; even if the content has some
bite for telling one what to do, Kant thinks that it comes entirely from deduction. For Kant
the question closely related to the Cl's being synthetic is: Does the CI apply to me? The
answer to this question is synthetic, and it depends on certain (a priori) facts about our moti-
vation.
These seem to me enlightening ways of putting these points.
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that the argument for the antithesis of the third antinomy showed to be incompat-
ible with the requirements of phenomenal existence. That is, in phenomenal ex-
perience everything that happens is causally, and hence hypothetically conditioned
by something else; but any categorical imperative states a moral demand that is
causally (i.e., motivationally) unconditional. Therefore the power to follow cate-
gorical imperatives, and hence to act from the motive of duty, which is just the
agent's moral nature, entails the existence of a power of noumenal freedom in her,
for such a power is one that is both causal and unconditioned. Thus we get a ver-
sion of (B) which focuses more closely on the distinctive thesis of the CI:
(C) A rational being has the (extra-phenomenal) power to act from purely moral
motives.
Based on the above quotations from Religion concerning rationality and personal-
ity in human beings, the subject concept of (C) would include the theoretical ca-
pabilities described in the first Critique, together with the power to act on hypo-
thetical imperatives. (C) is clearly synthetic, since the predicate mentions a charac-
teristic related to morality that is not a part of the subject; it is a priori, since it
makes claims about extra-phenomenal capabilities of such rational I moral beings.
This motivational interpretation provides an alternative to and thereby dispenses
with the temptation to ascribe to Kant rational intuitionist views in ethics that are
incompatible with his deeply held theoretical commitments about the limits of hu-
man powers of knowledge.61 And it brings to the front of our attention another
important characteristic of Kant's ethics, and gives it a clear textual basis: Kant's
motivational internalism.62
61 I think that one of the reasons why people have adopted the rational intuitionist view is
because they have had no clearly worked out alternative to consider.
62 Christine Korsgaard in "Skepticism about Practical Reason", Journal of Philosophy,
January 1986, 83:1, pp. 5 - 25, has emphasized Kant's internalism in ways I entirely agree
with; see especially her Section VII (pp. 23 - 25).
It might be useful to contrast the interpretation I have been offering here with "Kantian
constructivism," a sort of interpretation being developed by John Rawls, Onora O'Neill, and
others. I would mention first an important point of similarity. Probably all who call them-
selves constructivists in ethics are at the antipodes from ethical rational intuitionism, since
they wish to minimize epistemological and metaphysical claims that might seem to be en-
tailed by their ethical theories. Constructivists are mostly metaphysical minimalists, and in
that sense my reading of Kant should be closer to theirs than Ross' reading. However, sec-
ondly, Rawls' own philosophy, and his interpretation of Kant as well, at least so far as I know
it, has had little or nothing to say directly about inner motivation for mo~ality, .an~ hence
about that part of moral theory that Kant calls ethics. Rawls, centered as he IS on. Justice, has
tended to emphasize the political aspects of the CI. And indeed those passages In Kant that
are the most explicitly constructivist are from the Rechtslehre (MS, VI, 232) and ''Th:~ry
and Practice" (Ak., VIII, 297, and passim), where the subject is pOlitics and law. In politIcs
and law the kind of freedom we are most directly concerned with is external freedom. But
ethics, and hence inner freedom, is central in the present paper. Hence, the interpreta~ion
offered here and Kantian constructivism as I understand it, do not either agree or come Into
conflict because they are largely concerned with different topics.
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VI.
Kant also discusses the categorical imperative as synthetic a priori in his later
works, Religion and Metaphysics of Morals. In the Preface to the first edition of
Religion, Kant focuses on the idea of an objective, moral end, as an end that is
generated by pure practical reason, though it is not required for morality in gener-
al. Since human beings always have to conceive an end for any action, we should
talk about such an end as a part of moral theory, Kant urges. The end in question is
the highest good, which has two parts: virtue, and the happiness for which virtue is
the condition.63 Kant wishes to talk about the highest good in this context, because
this is the topic that lies on the border between morality and religion, which is the
area under discussion in Religion.
In a long note64 Kant writes about synthetic a priori propositions that arise in
this connection:
But that everyone ought to make the highest good possible in the world afinal end is a
synthetic practical proposition a priori (and indeed objectively practical) given by pure
reason; for it is a proposition which goes beyond the concept of duties in this world and
adds a consequence (an effect) thereof which is not contained in the moral laws and
therefore cannot be evolved out of them analytically.65
Kant presents this idea more fully a bit later66 where he talks about the extension
beyond the law to the end.
This extension is possible because of the moral law's being taken in relation to the nat-
ural characteristic of man, that for all his actions he must conceive of an end over and
above the law (a characteristic which makes man an object of experience). And further,
this extension (as with theoretical propositions a priori which are synthetic) is possible
only because this end embraces the a priori principle of the knowledge of the determin-
ing grounds in experience of a faculty of choice, so far as this experience, by exhibiting
the effects of morality in its ends, gives objective though merely practical reality to the
concept of morality as causal in the world.
Here Kant seems to be applying the doctrine of the fact of pure reason from the
second Critique to ends. The point seems to be this: we can sometimes notice that
people's actions seem to be affected by moral considerations, and more specifi-
cally, that their goals of action are so affected. From this we infer the practical
reality of morality in them. For instance, when I observe someone being scrupu-
lously honest in situations in which dishonesty could not be readily detected, what
I seem to be seeing is the practical effect of the influence of morality in this per-
son's actions.
63 See Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, VI, 4; 4.
64 Ibid., VI, 6 - 8n; 5 - 7n.
65 Ibid., VI, 7n; 6n.
66 Ibid., VI 7 - 8n; 7n, later in the same long note.
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The ends under discussion have been adopted and pursued because of the moral
commitments of the agents. They presuppose the moral motivation without which
~ey would not have been adopted. So although the talk in these Religion passages
IS of ends rather than motives, the ends are the product of the motives, and the
underlying synthetic a priori principle being alluded to is still (C).
Kant also writes about basic moral principles as analytic or synthetic at Section
X of the Introduction to the Tugendlehre, entitled, ''The Supreme Principle of the
Doctrine of Right Was Analytic; That of the Doctrine of Virtue Is Synthetic.,,67
It is clear in accordance with the principle of contradiction that, if external constraint
checks the hindering of outer freedom in accordance with universal laws (and is thus a
hindering of the hindrances of freedom), it can coexist with ends in general. I need not
go beyond the concept of freedom to see this; the end that each has may be whatever he
wills. The supreme principle ofRight is therefore an analytic proposition.
But the principle of the doctrine of virtue goes beyond the concept of outer freedom and
connects with it, in accordance with universal laws, an end that makes it a duty. This
principle is therefore synthetic. Its possibility is contained in the deduction (IX) ...
This extension beyond the concept of a duty of Right takes place through ends being
laid down, from which Right abstracts altogether.68
Here is how I understand these statements: only for the ethics do we need to pre-
suppose an inner motivational power of self-constraint. This power of self-con-
straint is the power to act purely from the motive of duty. Any human motivation
must express itself through the adoption of an end. So the purely moral motivation
has as its effect the adoption of an end which is at the same time a duty. Kant's
"deduction of' (=argument for) ends that are at the same time duties in his Section
IX is that "free" actions, which I understand as actions motivated by a purely mor-
al motive, must have an end of action like all other human actions, if that motive is
to be effective. The end of a morally motivated action cannot be a desire-based
end; it must rather have its basis in morality.69 This is what Kant calls an end that
is at the same time a duty.
Although Kant here explains the syntheticity of the ethical proposition in terms
of the adoption of an end, such an adoption presupposes the presence of the
purely ethical motivation of self-constraint as the motivational basis of its adop-
tion. Hence, here as in the earlier works, the syntheticity of the supreme principle
of morality is based on the power the principle has to be motivationally effica-
cious.
67 Metaphysics of Morals, VI, 396.
68 Ibid.
69 For a much more detailed discussion of this argument and Kant's doctrine of ends that
are at the same time duties, see my "Kant on Ends that Are at the Same Time Duties,". Pacific
~hilosophical Quarterly, 66 (1985), pp. 78-92. Henry Allison has c~mmented on this essay
m "Kant's Doctrine of Obligatory Ends," Ja1rrbuch fUr Recht und Ethik, Vol. I (1993), pp. 7-
23. My "Reply to Allison" is in the same volume, pp. 391-400.
458 Nelson Potter
In contrast, the principle of the philosophy of law, the universal principle of
righr7°, makes no similar motivational assumption. The source of the motivation to
obey the law is not internal, but external, viz., the fear of punishment. So we need
to make no such special internal motivational assumptions in the case of an exter-
nallaw. (We rather must assume an external structure, a state, with an enforcement
system in place.) The principle of Right, since it has no motivational assumptions,
is thus analytic.
The view that the CI expresses a basic moral insight or intuition, and that this is
why it is a synthetic proposition, is contradicted by Kant's statement that the phi-
losophy of law version of the categorical imperative is analytic. It is the necessity
of presupposing the availability of a certain kind of motivation that makes this
otherwise analytic proposition into a synthetic proposition, when it is altered to
become the supreme principle of ethics.
What makes the ethical propositions synthetic is their extension beyond the idea
of the moral law itself and the introduction of the idea of a morally determined end
or goal of action into the proposition. The passages from Religion and Metaphysics
ofMorals that we have looked at in this section express the same Kantian view we
presented in Sections IV and V; Kant is throughout concerned with the motiva-
tional efficacy of moral principles, but that idea is spelled out in terms of the
agent's pursuing morally determined ends in the later works. Hence Kant is talking
about the same synthetic a priori practical proposition, but he is doing so by men-
tioning the ends our moral natures move us to adopt, rather than by mentioning the
moral incentives that lead us to adopt those ends.
In summary, I conclude that all of these discussions of synthetic a priori ethical
propositions from four different works (Grundlegung, Critique of Practical Rea-
son, Religion, Tugendlehre) are talking about one single synthetic a priori proposi-
tion, though it is being talked about from different points of view, and in different
ways:
(C) A rational being has the (extra-phenomenal) power to act from purely moral mo-
tives.71
Is this proposition defensible? How would it be best understood in terms more
familiar to philosophers of the late 20th century? These are good questions, but
they bring us to the end of the present paper.72
70 See Metaphysics of Morals, VI, 230.
71 Kant writes. "Every legislation (Gesetzgebung) contains two elements : first. a law,
which sets forth as objectively necessary the action that ought to take place secondly a
motive, which joins a ground determining choice to this action subjectively with the thought
of the law." (MS, VI, 218, also quoted above) (C) expresses the "motive" part of the CI prin-
ciple. The "maxim that can be willed as a universal law" statement gives us the precept or
law portion of that same principle. The aim of this paper has been to focus attention on the
often neglected "motive" part of the CI.
The Synthetic A Priori Proposition
Zusammenfassung
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Nach Kant ist der kategorische Imperativ eirt synthetischer Satz a priori. Kant
k~nnte damit sagen wollen, wir hatten in die grundlegende moralische Wahrheit,
dIe der kategorische Imperativ darstellt, eine verntinftige Einsicht a priori, die
unserer Wahrnehmung der Formen, wie Plato sie sieht, vergleichbar ware. W. D.
Ross vertrat eine lihnliche Auffassung von einer verniinftigen menschlichen Ein-
sicht in gewisse grundlegende moralische Prinzipien, und in seinem Buch "Kant's
Ethical Theory" schrelbt er diese Auffassung auch Kant zu.
Ich behaupte, daB diese auf den ersten Blick als plausibel erscheinende Interpre-
tation nicht richtig ist, und daB der ,,rationale Intuitionismus", den sie impliziert,
Kants philosophischem Ansatz, sowohl in der ersten Kritik als auch in der Moral-
philosophie, ganz grundsatzlich widerspricht. Ich entwickele eine neue, alternative
Interpretation: Der kategorische Imperativ ist synthetisch, weil er eine Behauptung
tiber eine kausale / motivationale Kraft enthalt, die uns zukommt und die uns be-
Hihigt, ohne irgendeine UnterstUtzung durch bloB empirische oder Beweggrtinde
der Zweckrationaliiat wie Freude oder Schmerz allein aus der Vorstellung der
Pflicht heraus zu handeln. Soweit sie den verntinftigen Beweggrund zu handeln
betrifft, geht die Behauptung tiber die Bedeutung des kategorischen Imperativs als
eines rein ethischen Gebots hinaus. Sie ist a priori, da die QueUe des verniinftigen
Beweggrunds das noumenale Ich ist.
Jede Rechtfertigung des kategorischen Imperativs muB folglich zeigen, daB die
fragliche Art verniinftiger Beweggrtinde, die nicht Beweggrtinde bloBer Zweck-
rationalitat sind, in uns als Handelnden aktiv ist oder jedenfalls aktiv sein konnte
und daB Kant insoweit ein "Internalist" ist: das ist jemand, der meint, Moral und
Motivation seien innerlich, analytisch miteinander verbunden.
72 Earlier versions of this paper were read at the University of Wyoming, to the American
Philosophical Association Central Division in 1984, and to the Smith summer conference on
the Metaphysics of Morals in August of 1996. On all these occasions I received help~1 com-
ments. The following additional readers were also sources of useful comments: MarCIa Bar-
on, Edwin CUrley, Harry Ide, Kathleen Johnson, John Marshall, Mark Timmons, Mark van
Roojen, and a number of anonymous referees.
